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A DE VITI DE MARCO 
ITALY AND THE EUROPEAN 
WAR. TWO POLITICAL AD 
DRESSES. 



A. DE VITI DE MARCO 
ITALY AND THE EUROPEAN 
WAR. TWO POLITICAL AD- 
DRESSES. 



/ 



9tr 



THE ITALIAN RADICALS AND THE 

WAR. 

Address before the Roman Radical As- 
sociation. 

(February 22nd 191 5) 



^ 



MAY 4 ,9, 9 



The Italian Radicals and flu liar 



(i) 



TRIESTE AND GERMANY. 

The Radical Party in common with other 
parties, takes as starting point for its ac- 
tion the strictly national problem of the 
« terre irredente », (2) but must go fur- 
ther and consider it in relation to the 
European situation and the German Impe- 
rialist programme, which is the true cause 
of the present conflict. 

Trieste, — which is the symbolic word 
we use to designate the complex que- 
stion of our national claims on the eastern 
boundary and on the Adriatic, — has 
become an episode, a chapter, a number 
of the Imperialist programme of Germany. 
It is an Austrian port, in so far, and for 
so long as Austria continues to be an 



(1) Text of the declarations made on bohalf of the 
Council of the Roman Radical Association, by the Pre- 
sident, Hon. do Viti de Marco . at the meeting of the 
Association hold on February 20th 1915, and unani- 
mously ratili.nl by the Assembly. 

(2j « fcerrc irredente . or portions of the national do- 
main still unredeemed from foreign yoke. 



— 6 — 

integral part of the « Political System of 
German States » ; but according to the 
Pangerman programme Trieste is a Ger- 
man port, destined to become the great 
outlet upon the Adriatic which shall se- 
cure to « Greater Germany » the direct 
sea-route to the Mediterranean, evading 
the English military control of the Chan- 
nel, and of Gibraltar. 

Thus, in the question of Trieste, Ger- 
many is party in her own cause, more 
than ally of Austria. She contests the 
Italian possession of Trieste the more 
energetically the nearer appears the dis- 
memberment of Austria and the realisa- 
tion of Italian aspirations. 

Of this we have recent indications. In 
all the rumours that have arisen or been 
set afloat of concessions to Italy, there is 
talk of Trent, of the Dalmatian islands, 
of harbours on the Quarnero, of Fiume 
also..., always omitting the name of Trieste. 

We will hope that to this exclusion is 
due the failure of the mission ascribed 
by popular report to Prince von Biilow. 

At the final reckoning we do not think 
there will be found an Italian statesman 
disposed to sell Trieste to Germany, in 
order to acquire Trent from Austria, either 



— 7 — 

directly, or through political transfer. 
It is true that a former Cabinet Mini- 
ster, — who considers himself as taking 
a temporary holiday, — has hewn him- 
self behind the scenes, ready to appear 
before the curtain to propose this bargain: 
Italy to remain in the Triple .Alliance, pledg- 
ed to neutrality, in order to facilitate the 
success of the Austro-German arms, receiving 
in compensation a slice of the Trentino and 
perhaps some other trifle, — that « good 
deal » , in short, which would be at once 
the blackmail imposed by our conservatives 
on our Allies, and the sugarplum which the 
Italian Government would be obliged to fling 
to Democracy. 

Such traffic in reciprocal deception, could 
scarcely survive the present conflict; either 
Aaistro-German combination will win 
and the Trentino will be of no use to 
us, especially from the military point of 
view, for Italy will become more and more 
dependant upon Germany and Austria: — 
or the Entente will win, and we must 
square accounts with them. 

Moreover, while the initial policy of 
neutrality pure and simple justly claimed 
the respect of our old allies and won us 
the goodwill of the countries of the En- 



tente, the present attempt to negotiate with 
the Central Empires, discounts completely 
its value in the eyes both of our former 
allies, and of the Entente. 

The policy of neutrality pure and sim- 
ple is an unimpeachable position for Italy, 
diplomatically. The policy of bargained 
neutrality exposes us to the greatest dan- 
gers from the antagonism and retaliations 
of both sides. 

We must repudiate the offer, renouncing 
the bait of the Trentino. The problem 
of our national claims would be made 
more difficult, not solved, by rending a 
Bishopric from Austria, still an ally, in 
order at add a Prefecture to the Kingdom 
of Italy. 

Italian democracy wants war only be- 
cause it wants to solve a great problem : 
that of national unity and of the political 
independance of Italy in Europe. 

This problem remains completely outside 
the scope of our treaty of alliance, which 
did not contemplate, but excluded the case 
of a war undertaken by one of the allied 
States in order to establish its own poli- 
tical hegemony over all Europe including 
its own Allies ! It is a problem created by 
this European war in whose origin we 



— 9 — 

have no part, now forced upon every State 
in Europe whose nationality is still in- 
complete, and whose political indepen- 
dance is menaced. Italy is one of these 
States. 

Thus it is that our eventual military 
action for reclaiming the «terre irreden- 
te », and above all Trieste, while appear- 
ing to take the form of an offensive war 
against Austria, is really a war of defence 
against the sudden, but premeditated attack 
of Germany, and places us in the same 
defensive position as France, Belgium, En- 
gland, and Russia, who are fighting, at 
least for the present, against the danger of 
German Imperialism in Europe. 

THE QUESTION OF THE 
ADRIATIC. 

A few lines wil e to state clearly 

the integral question >f our national claims. 
Neither Austri -Hungary, nor Ger- 
many, have outlets of their own on the 
those shores of tl i atic whose po- 

pulation is Italian,; . >r have they known 
how to propitial Italian element, 

whose commerce interest would never- 
theless have fac the progress of 



10 



friendly political union with Austria, had 
the local traditions of Italian nationality 
and culture been respected. * 

The imminent danger of the dismem- 
berment of Austria, and the consequent 
prevision that the Italian element will be 
subjected to still ruder pressure from the 
Germans on one side and from the Slaves 
on the other, gives to the question a de- 
gree of urgency which it lacked before 
the war; it must and will be decided 
now, and Italy cannot remain a stranger 
to its settlement. 

From our point of view the settlement 
consists in the exclusion of every form of 
political dominion, — Austrian, German, 
or eventually Slave, — from the territory 
on the Adriatic coast whose population is 
Italian. 

Such a solution raises a grave question : 
that of the sea. 

Deprived of the sea, Austria and Hun- 
gary will ever tend toward its reconquest 

The trend of peoples towards the sea 
is traced in history by bloodshed and 
wars. It is not our intention to sew the 
seed of future conflicts while with the 
claim to reintegrate our national territory, 



— II — 

we seek today to eliminate a present cause 
of friction and conflict. 

But liberal democracy maintains that the 
sea should be freely open to traffic, and free 
navigation guaranteed to all mercantile ships. 

We must therefore be prepared to make 
the largest concessions., and to give the 
most precise guarantees of a commercial 
nature, so that free traffic by sea may be 
open at all times to the Italian ports on 
the Adriatic, and through these respectively 
to the Austrian, German, Slave or Hun- 
garian back-lands. 

Ready to concede the utmost on the 
commercial ground, we are to the same 
extent uncompromising on the political 
ground. 

The only reciprocal agreements and con- 
cessions of a political nature are those 
which can and should reasonably interve- 
ne between Italy and Serbia, south of 
Fiume. 

Here is the problem to be solved, with- 
out imperialistic exaggerations, but in 
its integrity, to eliminate a cause of last- 
ing conflict. 

And it must be solved by Italy in con 
forraity with her interests. As I have said, 
we cannot solve it by negotiating our- 



— 12 — 

neutrality with the Central Empires. Nor 
should we remain inactive until the end of 
the war, relying upon the goodwill of the 
States of the Entente, simply because they 
have declared that in the event of their 
victory, the new map of Europe will be 
determined b)^ the principle of nationality. 
Just because nationality is a principle, but 
not always a fact clearly defined by geo- 
grafic conditions, its pratical application 
will be subject to modification aud reci- 
procal concessions. 

We find ourselves in exactly this po- 
sition having on our borders a mixed po- 
pulation, and in Dalmatia Italian nuclei 
of a superior civilisation who are submerged 
by surrounding Slave populations of a lower 
grade of developement. 

Moreover, we know that England and 
France have no great interest in dismem- 
bering or excessively weakening Austria; 
that Russia aims above all at her own ag- 
grandisement and that of Serbia, and per- 
haps of Roumenia, and has therefore her 
reasons for discouraging the competition of 
Italy in the allotment of the available ter- 
ritory. 

Whence the necessity for our armed 
intervention, in order to arrive at the new 



13 



Peace Congress with the accomplished fact. 

And it is not enough to prepare by force 
of arms the accomplished fact, which must 
then receive the sanction of the Peace Con- 
gress, and be guaranteed against the danger 
of a counter action on the part of Austria 
and Germany. This is not possible with- 
out preliminary agreements with the na- 
tions of the Entente, and with Serbia. It 
will be easier to conclude such agreements 
on terms favourable to us now, during the 
war and while the present equilibrium 
of the belligerant forces remains unchan- 
ged. On no account should we come forth 
from the war isolated. 

Certainly one condition, the principle 
one for assuring the future tranquillity of 
Europe and the new geographical settle- 
ment and peaceful possession of the new 
acquisitions, lies in weakening the mena- 
cing superior military organisation of Ger- 
many. It is our interest, like that of the 
belligerant States, and especially of the 
small neutral States, to w T ear out Prussian 
militarism. 

But it is not our interest to crush Ger- 
many, as we begin to hear said by a few, 
already intoxicated in anticipation with a 



— 14 — 

victory which may safely be predicted, but 
which does not yet seem very near. 

We have no desire to assist, in oppo- 
sition to our Allies of yesterday, in the re- 
suscitation of old dreams of hegemony, 
nor in the creation of new dreams. 

A disquieting symptom was apparent in 
the hostile reception given by the French 
press to the resolutions passed by the So- 
cialist Conference in London, in which 
the international socialists endorsed the 
war of liberation, not that of conquest; & 
resolution entirely in harmony with our 
interests and with the thought of Italian 
radicalism. 

Another grave symptom, confirmed by 
the declarations of M. SazonofF, is the 
eventual agreement for consenting to the 
Russian occupation of the Dardanelles. This 
touches a vital Italian interest, that of 
our commerce in the Black Sea, and 
especially with Roumania, which supplies 
us with wheat. 

If we are opposed to the German aim 
to occupy the Dardanelles under a Tur- 
kish title, we are equally opposed to the 
similar intention on the part of Russia, 
We demand the freedom of the seas. 

Whence may be seen how difficult is 



__ I5 __ 

the task of diplomatic preparation, sur- 
passing that of the military occupation of 
the territory to be redeemed. 

We are not informed whether the Go- 
vernment is working in this direction, or 
what ground has been covered, or whether 
it is likely to succeed in bringing the 
enterprise to a successful issue. We do 
not know the facts sufficientyl to form a 
judgment, still less to give advice. We must 
wait to judge the work of the Govern- 
ment in the light of the accomplished fact. 

To us as an organised party, falls a 
different task: — that of the moral pre- 
paration of the country. The great ma- 
jority of our people is ignorant of the 
problem, which must be illustrated in all 
its parts; in the causes which have deter- 
mined the conflict; in its political objects; 
in its financial and economic repercussion 
upon all classes of citizens. 

So only, by military preparation, by 
diplomatic preparation, and by moral pre- 
paration, will it be possible for us to face 
the great struggle. 



— U — 

THE PARLIAMENTARY SITUATION 
AND THE RADICALS. 

So far I have perhaps forgotten the part 
devolving upon Parliament. The omission 
indeed is not altogether unmerited, for 
the deputies have been silent; shew them- 
selves desirous of remaining silent; ask no 
light from the Government, and give no 
light to the country. 

The apathy of the Chamber of Depu- 
ties has been said to shew that Neutralist 
currents have prevailed there. This may be 
doubted since it cannot be said that recent 
manifestations throughout the country, — 
if we except the letter of the Hon. Giolitti, 
— point to such a change. 

It is perhaps more prudent to think that 
the European war was of lively interest 
to our political representatives during the 
fleeting moment when it seemed likely to 
furnish a casus belli against the Ministry! 
But when the Giolitti an majority, had to 
abandon its intention of provoking a great 
Parliamentary crisis, it ceased to take an 
interest in the little European crisis. 

Despite the quiet w aters of Montecitorio 
we know that there is a Ministry in per- 
petual ambush facing the Ministry tempo- 



— i 7 — 

rarily in power. The thought of each is 
known to us officially, from a comparison 
of the Parliamentary declarations of our 
Premier, now somewhat out of date, with 
the more recent extra-parliamentary letter 
of Giolitti. It is a question of choosing bet- 
ween two lines of conduct which, both starting 
from an armed and vigilant neutrality , at a 
given moment diverge, turning, the one, (that 
of Hon. Giolitti) towards absolute neutralify 
with due reservations ; and the other, 
(that of Hon. Salandr-a) towards armed in- 
tervention WITH DUE RESERVATIONS ! 

It has seemed at times that the diver- 
gence was to become more accentuated ; 
but it is always possible in politics that 
the diverging lines may meet. The danger 
remains that the two reservations, may at 
a certain moment combine, and with one 
accord completely elude our aspirations ! 

While our preference cannot be doubtful, 
we cannot, even in the special question of 
foreign policy, express our confidence in 
the Government, from which we are di- 
vided, moreover, on several very important 
questions of political and economic policy, 
which have for the moment become se- 
condary. 

in conclusion, the position which the 



i8 



radical party must take regarding parlia- 
mentary policy and the Government is this 
we must prevent a crisis — untimely for 
us, and timely for others ! — from inter- 
vening to free the Salandra Ministry from 
the responsibilities which through the Par- 
liamentary declarations of its Premier it 
has assumed toward the country. 

In the existing Parliamentary situation, 
we must prevent an assault upon the more 
or less armoured « postal diligence (i)»; and 
above all we must prevent members of the 
Radical Party from joining the assailants. 

Still less could we tolerate anything so 
equivocal as a new Ministry in Radical 
guise, accredited by the presence of a Ra- 
dical member set as transition head of 
the Giolittian crowd, pending the return of 
the authentic Boss. 

Not only would this substitution fail to 
reassure us in view of the pressing poli- 
tical question of the moment, but it would 
introduce again into the whole conduct of 
Italian politics, that degenerate confusio- 
nistn which was condemned by the last 
Congress of the Radical Party. 



(1) Postal diligence ; term once humourously applied 
to the Sonnino Ministry when after an hundred days 
in office it was assailed by the Giolittian opposition » 



19 



The prestige of the Radicals in the 
country, is still suffering from the pre- 
ceding Radico-Giolittian coalition; the Party 
needs to be reconstituted and invigorated 
by a reasonable period of ministerial ab- 
stinence, and of political activity. 

Those of our friends who took part in 
the Giolitti Ministry, although they did 
not in reality share in the direction of 
its general policy, are still legally co - re- 
sponsible and involve the party respon- 
sibility, for the waste and disorder in the 
accounts following the expenses of the 
Libian War; thev are responsible for the 
Decree of Sovereignty which is the true 
and exclusive cause of the prolongation 
of the war against Turkey and its enormous 
expense ; they are responsible, and involve 
the party responsibility, for deficient mi- 
litary preparation and the disorganised 
condition of the railways, which placed 
Italy in so painful a situation in the tragic 
hour which determined the great conflict. 

We all remember that at the announ- 
cement of the Ultimatum of Austria to 
Serbia, many of us said that Italy should 
at once have denounced the Triple Alliance; 
but we were made to understand that, 
being completely disarmed, we could no 1 



— 20 — 

threaten those who wereperfectly armed. 

It is well now that the rest should be 
known. Upon our refusal to send the corpo- 
ral with the famous flag to the French fron- 
tier, the Governments of \Austria and Germany 
considered the expediency of denouncing the 
treaty themselves, to acquire liberty of action 
against Italy. 

Those who are responsible for this cri- 
tical situation have since boasted that they 
knew the intentions of Austna a year be- 
fore we became aware of them, 

And now we understand how, prompted 
by an instinct of self-preservation they 
first sought, in the sitting of November 
2ist, to get control of the Government 
in order to prevent the Ministry, pressed 
by public opinion clamouring for interven- 
tion, from arraigning them for thelfmilitan, 
preparation. We understand how, the first 
attempt having been foiled, they next un- 
furled the imposing banner of neutrality, of 
fidelity to treaties, of the economic interests 
of the working classes, in order to avoid, or 
defer the hour of the supreme test. 

And we for the same reasons, demand that 
those responsible should remain at the 
disposal of the Nation and out of Office. 



THE RADICAL PLATFORM AS 
PRESENTED AT A BY-ELECTION. 
GALLIPOLL 

(March 21st 1915) 



Ilie Mini flfti 
as presented at a Bv-Eiertion. ° 



THE EUROPEAN CRISIS AND THE 
ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. 

To present today an electoral platform 
is an arduous undertaking in view of the 
economic depression which weighs heavily 
upon the working-classes and of the great 
European Crisis which eclipses every pro- 
blem of internal policy, however im- 
portant. 

An electoral platform seems to me too 
great a thing when confronting the specific 
problem of this time of distress, too small 
when confronting the general problem of 
the European War. 

The crisis of the war arrested the work 



(1) This address was delivered at a 
Gallipoli. on March 14th 1915. The ' otion took place 
on the following Sunday March 21^, and the orator 
was returned to Parliament by a large majority. 



— 2 4 — 

begun patiently during the past years for 
regulating local finances, constructing school 
buildings, railways, tramways and harbours, 
and improving the civil service. The pro- 
blem of local finances which in the past 
we have often pointed out as the chief 
and most urgent oi Italian financial ques- 
tions, must also await the end of the war. 
But it must then be comprised in the new 
general reform of taxation which will 
be imposed in consequence of the war on 
all States, even the non-belligerant States. 

By a fatal sequence of cause and effect 
the European War affects not only the 
belligerant countries, but also neutral coun- 
tries through the network of international 
exchange by which all commercial nations 
are today linked together, and Italy is espe- 
cially hard hit because of the great masses 
of emigrants who are obliged suddenly to 
return from abroad, thus increasing disoc- 
cupation and distress at home. 

Nor does the situation bear equally even 
upon the different regions in Italy; it is less 
felt in the north, where the production of 
wheat is larger and where side by side with 
the industries paralysed by the war, other 
industries profit by it and prosper. While 
in Southern Italy, and especially in this 



— 2 3 — 

region, where the cultivation of wheat is 
reduced to a minimum, where the exten. 
sion of vineyards is greatest and where 
there are none of the industries that produce 
Army and Navy supplies, the harmful re- 
sults are manifested in the total difference 
between the higher price of the wheat we 
have to buy, and the lower price of the 
wine we need to sell, and cannot sell. 

The rise in wheat and the fall in the 
price of wine are co-related phenomena, 
since the consumption of wine by the 
working-classes at the north is notably 
diminished owing to the high price of bread 
and of the most necessary articles of food. 

In the measures taken to meet the crisis 
the Government, while seeking to eliminate 
famine prices, instead of abolishing wholly 
and at once the duty on cereals, pandered 
to the popular prejudice against monopoly 
and speculation, and aggravated the con- 
dition of the market. 

Moreover, instead of preventing any ex- 
portation of wheat to the Central Empires, 
these were permitted to import large quan- 
tities to the detriment of the Italian con- 
sumer. 

The mistake of the Government is due 
to the policy of agrarian protection and 



26 



subservience to the Triple Alliance, to 
which the present Ministry like its prede- 
cessors has held itself bound, and against 
which my friends and I have always fought. 

Had the outbreak of hostilities found 
Italy under the system of Free Trade, or 
even had the entire duty on cereals been 
abolished from August until the new har- 
vest, the crisis would certainly not have 
become so acute, for we should then have 
been able to get in our supply at 30, 
instead of at 40 francs, 

The protectionist error costs the buyers 
of wheat at least 200 millions of francs 
this year by reason of the raised price. 
Limiting our example to the political con- 
stituency of Gallipoli alone, whose popu- 
lation is about 83,000 inhabitants and 
where practically no wheat is produced, the 
increase in price represents an extra burden 
of 650,000 francs for a term of six months. 

This is not all; the other specific cause 
of the wheat famine is the closing of the 
Dardanelles, (the route by which we re- 
ceive our supply of wheat), imposed on 
Turkey, — cur enemy of yesterday, — 
by Germany, our Ally of yesterday,., and, 
they say, also of today. 

Our government made no protest against 



— 27 — 

the closing of the Dardanelles; did not 
insist upon the free passage of neutral 
Italian and Rumenian ships,., and yet dur- 
ing the Libian War we were forbidden 
to attack the Dardanelles, and Turkey was 
required to leave them open to European 
commerce. 

At this moment in which the Anglo - 
French fleet is forcing the Dardanelles, 
in which one of the greatest historical 
events of the century, and perhaps of ma- 
ny centuries to come, — the expulsion 
of the Turk from Europe, — is about 
to take place ; — in which the occupation 
of Constantinople will decide the future 
of the Straits and the question of free 
commerce in grain, our fleet is not coope- 
rating; we have no part in the portentous 
event with which are bound up the mem- 
ories of the past and the aspirations of 
the future. 

ITALIAN NEUTRALITY 
AND GERMANY. 

And now let me state a few facts, and 
ask a question : 

This war has driven back to our 
country tens of thousands of emigrants 
with their families; 



28 



This war has closed to us our usual 
export markets; 

This war has, by the closing of the 
Dardanelles, cut off the avenue of our 
wheat supply; 

This war has raised the price of all 
food stuffs and lowered the price of arti- 
cles of luxury including wine. 

Is it our interest, is it the direct inter- 
est of the labouring classes of Southern 
Italy that this state of war should end as 
soon as possible ? Is it our duty so to 
direct our foreign policy as to hasten the 
end of this European War ? 

Or do you prefer that the labouring 
classes to whom the outlet of emigration 
is denied, should be condemned to a slow 
death by starvation ? 

This is the problem which the Euro- 
pean War places before the Italian prole- 
tariat, and especially the agricultural pro- 
letariat of Southern Italy. 

Now the present state of armed and 
vigilant neutrality is to the military advan- 
tage of Germany, and is to the economic 
advantage of a few centres or groups of 
merchants, manufacturers and workmen 
who do not represent Italian commerce, 



— 29 — 

Italian industries, nor the working-class 
of Italy. 

The state of armed neutrality is profi- 
table to works for arms and ammunition, 
since Italy is arming as though she were at 
war ; it is profitable to all the contraband 
traders who starve the Italian people in 
order to feed the soldiers of Austria and 
Germany; it is profitable to a small cate- 
gory of workmen employed in the manu- 
facture of articles required for the army 
and navy, or in the Italo-Austrian contra- 
band traffic. 

Neither as masters nor as workmen do 
you belong to any of the groups thus 
shamefully enriching themselves. You sim- 
ply pay the extra profits of the one and of 
the other. The longer the European war, 
lasts, and the armed neutrality of Italy, the 
longer will be your sufferings. Should the 
war continue for three years, as many fore- 
see, and should Italy remain neutral and ar- 
med, I can see at the end only bankruptcy 
for Apulia. Yet this may be called the war 
of Apulia: It is the war on the issues of 
which will depend some important fea- 
tures of the economic future of Apulia. 

The present war will decide whether 
the possibility of independent national life 



30 



is to be vouchsafed to the Balkan States,, 
or whether they shall be subject to the 
political and commercial influence of Au- 
stria, and therefore of Germany. 

Austria aims at making the Balkan Pe- 
ninsula subservient to her system of cus- 
toms, railways and harbours, excluding 
Serbia, Montenegro, and Albania from the 
Adriatic, imposing a system of railways 
from north to south from Vienna to Sa- 
lonicco, and obstructing railway comuni- 
cation from east to west, from the Danube 
and the Black Sea to the Adriatic. 

This threefold system of customs, rail- 
ways, and harbours, tends to secure to 
Austria economic monopoly in the Balkans 
to the exclusion of Italy, and above all of 
Apulia. Yet by reason of her geographical 
position, vicinity, and historical precedents 
Apulia is peculiarly destined to derive benefit 
from those relations of culture and of 
commercial interests which in a regime of 
liberty would certainly be established bet- 
ween the Balkan States and Italy. 

It is of evident interest especially for A- 
pulia, that the Austro-German block should 
be defeated, that the Balkan nationalities 
should definitely arrest the eastward trend 
of Austrian policy ; that we and the Balkan 



3i 



States should cement bonds of amity, open- 
ing the way for the economic penetration 
of Italy in the near East. 

But we have other and greater problems 
involved in the European conflict. 

There is the problem of the completion 
of our national unity. This has been con- 
sidered by some a mere sentimental aspi- 
ration. It is far from that. Trent and Trieste 
are required for the defence of the Italian 
frontier against Austria. The political and 
military safety of Italy depend upon the 
conquest of boundaries along the chain of 
the Alps, comprising Trent, Trieste, Pola 
and Istria. 

For thirty years, during the Alliance, we 
have been at the mercy of Austria. For 
special military reasons it serves the inte- 
rest of the Central Empires to keep us 
at their mercy. Without Trent and the 
contested coast of the Adriatic our national 
defence requires the maintenance of three 
army corps and a big fleet in the Adriatic. 
The establishment of our natural confines 
would remove a latent cause of conflict 
with our near Eastern neighbours, and 
would permit a considerable reduction in 
military expenses. 

The problem of the vindication of our 



— 32 — 

claims, then, not only revives the sentiments 
and ideals of the Italian Risorgimento, hut 
comprises also material interests imme- 
diate and permanent. 

But to ensure these advantages it is ne- 
cessary that the problem be solved in its 
integrity. A strip of the Trentino, in other 
words, would not suffice, because there 
would still remain the thorn of « frredenti- 
smo » (i) and the competition of armaments 
between Italy and Austria. 

But even if we go no further toward 
th e complete solution of the problem than 
the occupation of Trieste added to that of 
the Trentino, we find ourselves face to face 
with Germany. 

Here is the gravest question. It is this 
point that has recently convulsed public 
opinion when it was unexpectedly announ- 
ced that an agreement had been reached 
between the Ministry and Germany by 
which the Trentino would be ceded in 
exchange for the pledge to remain neutral. 

To realise the significance of this report 
it is necessary to refer to the programme for 
the fulfilment of which Germany desired 



(1) - Movement for the redemption of the Italian po- 
pulations subject to Austrian rule. 



— 33 — 

and provoked the war. This is revealed to 
us by General Von Bernhardi whose fa- 
mous book cannot have been published 
unauthorised. 

« A victorious campaign settled matters 
« with Austria, who did not willingly cede 
(( the supremacy in Germany, and left the 
« German Imperial Confederation without 
(( forfeiting her place as a Great Power, 
tf France was brought to the ground with 
«a mighty blow; the vast majority of the 
« German peoples united under the Impe- 
« rial cfown which the King of Prussia 
(( wore ; the old idea oj the German Empire 
(( was revived in a federal shape by the Tri- 
ce pie Alliance of Germany, ^Austria, and 
« Italy. The German idea as ^Bismarck fan- 
« ooed it, ruled from the North Sea to the 
« Adriatic and the Mediterranean. Like a 
« phoenix from the ashes, the German 
giant rose from the sluggard-bed of the 
« old German Confederation, and stretched 
cc his mighty limbs ». (i) 

So then, Italy is already a part of the 
political system of German States y like Austria 



(i) vedi — ;i Germany and the next War ", by Gene- 
ral von Bernhardi. (English translation by Allen H, 
Powles. Popular edition. Edward Arnold. London. 1915 
»»ge 66. 



— 34 — 

and Turkey. In the conception of Pan-Germa- 
nism, Austria is the long arm of Germany 
in the Balkans, reaching to the Aegean ; 
Turkey is the long arm of Germany in 
Asia Minor, as far as the Persian Gulf; 
and Italy is the long German arm in the 
Western Mediterranean. 

Between Austria and Italy there is there- 
fore to be no rivalry : Italy must give up 
her interests in the Adriatic, and direct her 
activities in the Mediterranean against the 
English and French colonies of North 
Africa, under the orders and in the inte- 
rests of (( Greater Germany ». 

So much for an understanding of the 
position between Italy and Germany as 
regards Trieste at this moment in which 
the conscience of the people, suddenly il- 
lumined by events has sheA\n its firm 
determination to confront Pan - Germanist 
pretentions and to vindicate its national 
independance as a Sovereign State. 

In the eyes of Germany we are today 
a rebellious vassal. More then ever Ger- 
many looks toward Trieste as her port 
in the Adriatic, and upon the Adriatic as 
her sea because the only route to the Med- 
iterranean by which she can evade En- 
glish control lies through Trieste and the 



— 35 — 

Adriatic. Hence it is no longer Austria 
alone but Germany, that contests with us 
the dominion of the Adriatic. 

Admitting these facts, is it possible to 
suppose that Germany will consent to the 
complete solution of our national problem ? 

I exclude the possibility. But even on the 
hypothesis that under extreme pressure 
Germnny should give her consent, such an 
agreement would become for her at the 
close of the war, a piece af paper. 

POLITICAL PARTIES AND 
THE WAR. 

The recent rumour of an Italo-German 
agreement on a reduced scale may seem 
plausible to our conservatives who wish 
neither to separate from Germany nor to 
draw nearer to the Entente, and who 
would only be disposed to make war upon 
Austria ! 

Out of this contradictory state of mind 
it is possible that some sort of hybrid 
compromise should come forth in the na- 
ture of that which has been voiced abroad 
within the past few days. 

But the :onscience of the people will 
son do jus ice to it. 



3 6 



Before so formidable an enemy as Ger- 
many, the dilemma is clear : — either we 
resolve now the military and political pro- 
blem through agreements and under the 
guarantee of Europe at the coming Treaty 
of Peace or we shall silently disappear from 
the number of the Great Powers, and be- 
come a dependancy* of the German Empire! 

Some of the Neo - Conservatives think 
that in the happy position of a Vassal 
State of Germany, we shall enjoy a long 
and well-ordered peace, in which enemies 
from without shall have disappeared, and 
enemies from within, — Democracy, — 
shall be restrained and kept subject and 
in check. 

Instead, that would happan to us which 
has already befallen Austria and Turkey- 
Far from enjoying the blissful peace of a 
country which has consented to place itself 
under a foreign protectorate, we should be 
militarised and constrained to increase our 
land and sea forces which, Under the direc- 
tion of the Greater General Staff, would 
be used not for defending the national inde- 
pendance of our country, but for conquering 
the world for the benefit of « Greater 
Germany ». 

As the true terms of the problem have 



— 37 — 

gradually become clearer to people's minds 
we have witnessed noteworthy changes in 
the tendancies of political parties. 

At first, when it was thought that the 
vindication of our national claims only cal- 
led for war against Austria, we observed 
a general warlike impulse, shared alike by 
democrats and conservatives, both faithful to 
the traditions of the Risorgimento. Only 
the purely clerical element stood apart, 
still hoping to find in Vienna the keys of 
some sort of galvanised Temporal Power. 

Later, when behind Austria the spiked 
helmet of the Kaiser came into view, the 
spirit of peace abruptly invaded the con- 
servatives, war fiends of a day before. 

The Italian Conservative may be a hater 
of Austria but will never cease to be a 
worshipper of Germany. Divided between 
fear of German military force and admira- 
tion of the Teutonic antiparliamentary 
and antidemocratic rule, he has found in 
armed neutrality a banner covering the 
contraband of manifold interests. 

For the same reasons, obversely, no sooner 
did the spectre of Teutonic Imperialism ap- 
pear in the background of the gigantic pic- 
ture, with its menace of internal policy in 
German style, than democracy emphasized 



- 3 8- 

Its tendancy toward armed intervention at 
the side of the States of the Entente, vho 
are fighting for the national independance 
of States, and for the liberty of Peoples. 

However the problem is poorly presented 
in the crude formal dilemma of interven- 
tion or neutrality. There cannot be partisans 
of war for war's sake, nor of neutrality 
merely for neutrality. The crucial point 
lies in defining the object to be attained 
by intervention or by neutrality when peace 
is signed at the end of the European conflict. 

I will state at once on general lines what 
we who represent radical democracy aim to 
attain. 

i .) The States of the Entente have repea- 
tedly affirmed that the new map of Europe 
will be modified according to the principle of 
nationality. Accordingly we intend that Italy 
shall not issue from this European war 
without having assured either with the 
weapons of diplomacy or of the army, her 
natural boundaries in relation to Austria 
Hungary and the Adriatic, in conformity 
with her interests. 

2.) To secure the permanency of this con- 
quest, it is essential that Italy should not 
emerge isolated from the present conflict 
at the mercy, in a military sense of Germany. 



— 39 — 

3-) The Central Empires have initiated 
and carried on the war, violating treaties, the 
Law of Nations and the principles of huma- 
nity, the honour of women, private property, 
and wantonly sacrificing the lives of chil- 
dren and non-combattants. 

Accordingly we do not intend that such 
barbarous propensities should ever again 
be allowed to overmaster humanity and 
submerge European civilisation. 

4.) We intend that after this ruthless and 
insane warfare a lasting peace shall be 
assured to all European States great and 
small. 

5.) We intend that the new treaty of 
peace should oblige all the States of Europe 
to reduce their military expenses. 

6.) We intend that by the new treaty of 
peace all the civilised States of Europe should 
pledge themselves to the gradual lowering 
of customs barriers. 

7.) We intend that the freedom of the seas 
be recognised by the new treaty of peace. 

8.) We intend that by the new treaty of 
peace the principle of the Open Door 
should be adopted in all colonies belonging 
to European States. 

These are our conditions for the future 
peace. 



— 40 — 

In this statement of our aspirations will 
be found the explanation of the strange 
fact that pacifists, liberals, and antimili- 
tarists the world over, have become inter- 
ventionists in order to put an end to Ger- 
man militarism. 

Our militarists on the contrary, have 
almost all become pacifists. They hope that 
the neutrality of Italy may secure victory 
to the arms of Germany, and that this 
may reanimate in all Europe the growth 
of that militarism which consists in conti- 
nually augmenting military expenses with- 
out ever engaging in warfare. 

To these may be added the sons and de- 
scendants of the Legitimists; — followers 
of the Bourbons, of the Popes, or of the 
various graduated Grand Dukes, all oL 
whom are also for peace; that is, for neu- 
trality in favour of Austria. 

Beside these, those Conservatives who 
look to the triumph of the German arms 
to establish the political hegemony in Eu- 
rope of the antiparliamentary and antidemo- 
cratic regime still in vigour in the Central 
Empires. 

The warriors in time of peace, the 
Austrianised Clericals and the Conserva- 
tive snobs who ape the Kaiser's anti-par- 



— 4i ~ 

liamentary poses, have now been joined by 
the Italian Official Socialists, I mean by a 
fraction af them ; a fraction which dwindles 
daily, emancipating itself from the better 
element, moral and intellectual, but which 
nevertheless controls the electoral machi- 
nery and speaks in the name of party. 

In spite of political exaggerations I can- 
not believe that the Official Socialists re- 
ally desire the success of the Teutonic poli- 
tical regime. They know that the econo- 
mic position of the labouring man in En- 
gland, France, and Belgium, is by far supe- 
rior to that of the labouring man in 
Germany. They know that in Parliamentary 
countries the economic condition of the 
labourer has improved in proportion as h e 
has gained in political influence. They 
cannot have forgotten that in Italy the eco- 
nomic betterment of the labourer followed 
the victorious struggle for the right to 
strike and to organize. In a word they 
know that political liberty is the condition 
of the economic development of the people. 

But they think, perhaps, that the 
forces of the Triple Entente suffice to 
overthrow Prussian militarism in Europe. 

I do not know whether they suffice; but I 
do know that unless new forces intervene 



4 2 



to disturb the balance of the belligerants 
the war will be greatly prolonged, and I 
know that the essential point, as I have 
said, is to formulate the programme for 
the future Peace according to the Liberal 
point of view, and win public opinion to 
its support; — I know that the program- 
me of the Ministry is not ours; whence 
it follows that the first duty of all sections 
of Democracy, alike of Socialist and of 
Liberal Democracy, independently of War, 
or Peace or Neutrality, is to mobilise all 
our forces so as to create in the country 
the political currents which shall enable 
our programme to issue triumphant from 
the future Peace Congress. 

Shall we or shall we not obtain disar- 
mament ? Shall we obtain the lowering of 
Customs barriers ? Shall we obtain for 
our emigrants perfect juridical equality of 
treatment in the colonies of European 
States ; for instance, in Tunis ? 

Now a fraction of Socialist Democracy 
h as declared that it is not concerned with 
these problems which affect the economic 
future of the working classes. 

Probably they think that as the forces of 
the Allies are sufficient for the overthrow 
of the Central Empires so we, of the Liberal 



— 43 — 

Democracy, should suffice for the defence 
of the real and permanent interests of the 
proletariat. 

Perhaps for themselves they reserve one 
function only ; — to exploit the economic 
distress of the masses — distress already- 
existing on account of the European war 
and not dependant upon Italy's eventual 
intervention, — in order to say afterwards 
that they were opposed to the war, thus 
creating for themselves an electoral alibi 
which will enable who knows how many 
of them to run the race of bloodless battles 
and profitable electoral victories. 

We accept the challenge and will do 
our duty by the proletariat and the people, 
in whose interest my friends and I enter 
the field, fighting as of old against their 
traditional enemies, especially the mono- 
polies supported by agrarian and indu- 
strial protection. This election is a mere 
skirmish in the struggle in which we shall 
engage in the country and in Parliament. 



APPENDIX 

OPEN LETTER TO THE LIBERAL 
VOTERSHdf "' THE CONSTITUENCY 
OE GALLIPOLI. 

(March 191 5). 



Id the Constituents of mill. 



0) 



The electoral contest assumes today an 
importance and significance which far 
exceed the limits of a single constituency,, 
and the responsibility of the voters becomes 
more weighty in this tragic and solemn 
hour in which the destinies of our country 
are being formed. 

To-day, more then ever, a fearless re- 
cognition of the duties involved, clear 
vision of the interests of the country, 
absolute independance, steadfastness of cha- 
racter and will, are required of him who 
accepts the political mandate. We are 
confident that the people of Gallipoli will 
recognise and appreciate these rare quali- 
ties in their former deputy, returning him 
to Parliament by unanimous vote, after 
a brief and regrettable interval. 



(1) - Opon letter written by friends on behalf of fche 
Roman Radical Association and addressed to the vo- 
ters at Gallipoli after their nomination of De Viti De 
Marco as candidate for election to Parliament. 



48 



Antonio De Viti De Marco has given 
his thought to those severe studies most 
essential to the direction of public affairs. 
Without restricting himself to the field 
of the economic sciences of which he is 
one of the most distinguished exponents, 
uniting thought to action, he has made 
of his ideas a living force to stimulate the 
national conscience to renewed energy. 

Rising from the central problem of 
economic liberty to the conception of liberty 
in all fields of social life, he courageously 
upheld and defended ihs convictions when 
the storm of reaction was at its height 
menacing in Parliament and without the 
progressive movements of the new era. 

By word spoken or written, from the 
University chair and from the Parliamen- 
tary tribune, he has been the constant 
advocate of those doctrines of Free Trade 
in the name of which he opposed protec- 
tionist tariff reform in 1887, revealing its 
background of corruption and local intri- 
gue. Recent events have proved De Viti 
De Marco to have been in the ri^ht, and 
have shewn with ho^ much acumen and 
with what insight bom of devotion he 
has studied the problem of the South, and 
has understood the true interests of Italy. 



49 



In fact while the duties on cereals have 
not helped to solve tke problem of natio- 
nal alimentation thev have become an enor- 
mous weight for the consumers throughout 
Italy, and for the agricoltural producers 
of the South. 

At the outbreak of the European war 
De Viti De Marco found his place natu- 
rally among those who are eager for the 
independa-nce of peoples, for the triumph 
of the principle of nationality, and for the 
supremacy of law. In incisive addresses 
before the Roman Radical Association of 
which he was acclaimed President, he 
clearly outlined the place of Italy in the 
conflict, and pointed out the dangers to 
which she is exposed by a policy of neu- 
trality at any cost. 

Radical by sentiment and by conviction, 
De Viti De Marco belongs to that pha- 
lanx of political men whose action cannot 
be confined within the often narrow limits 
of a party, but extends to the wider field 
of efficient reform which demands the 
practical collaboration of men of different 
political schools, united in their acceptance 
of such a fundamental conception of li- 
berty and of the sovereignty of the people 
as they deem inseparable from a just and 



— 50 — 

high sense of civic and patriotic obli- 
gations.' 

And men of every liberal party rally 
today around Antonio De Viti De Marco, 
and overcoming his modest reluctance send 
him forth again to do battle in the Legis- 
lative Assembly, grateful to you, Consti- 
tuents of Gallipoli, and happy if the 
Italian Parliament can again avail itself 
of the services of this valiant and fearless 
representative of the South, (i) 



Francesco Area, deputy (Radical) - 
''Prof. Gino c Bandini, of the Central 
Direction of the Radical Party - Sal- . 
vatore c Bar%ilai, deputy (Republican) 
'President of the 'Press As socio Hon ~ 
Leonida Bissolati, deputy (Socialist) 
- 'Prince Scipione Borghese - Giuseppe 
Bruccoleri, advocate, correspondent of 
the « Giornale di Sicilia » - Leone 
Caetani, Prince of Teano - Trof. 
Gustavo Canti - Giovanni Colonna, 
Duke of Cesar b, deputy ( Radical) - 
Silvio Drago, advocate - Trof Luigi 
Einaudi, of the R. University of 



(1) In the original : questo intern erato ftf/Jio del Messo- 
t;;omo. 



— 5 i — 

Turin - Niccold Fancello, L. L. T>. 

- Antonio Fradeletto, deputy - Luigi 
Fera, deputy (%adical ) - Giuseppe 
Girardini, deputy (Radical) - Edoardo 
Giretti, deputy ( %adical ) - Conte 
Francesco Guicciardini, deputy (Li- 
beral) former Minister for Foreign 
Affairs - Matteo Incagliati, correspon- 
dent of the « Giornale d' Italia » - 
Agostino Lan^illo, advocate - Filippo 
Naldi, L. L. D. editor of the « Resto 
del Carlino » - Giuseppe Montesano, 
M. D. - Salvatore Mastrogiovanni, 
advocate - Giuseppe c Pre%%olwi, cor- 
respondent of the « Topolo d' Italia » 

- Nello Ouilicij L. L. D. correspon- 
dent of the « %esto del Carlino » - 
Trof Gaetano Salvemmi, of the <r R^. 
University of Tisa, editor of the 
« Unitd » - Luigi Saraceni, deputy 
(%epubl.) - Prof. Francesco Scaduto. 
of the %^. University of %pme - Trof 
Vittorio Scialoia, of the %_. Univer- 
sity of %pme, Senator - Carlo Sci- 
monelli, advocate - Guglielmo Zagari, 
advocate, member of the Direction of 
the %pman %_adical Association. 



CONTENTS. 

Page 

I. The Italian Radicals and the War . 5 

II. The Radical Platform as presented 

at a By-Election 23 

Appendix 

Open letter from representatives of 
various political parties to the politi- 
cal constituents of Gallipoli. ... 47 



Tip. PopolaiH — Vi» Colsereno 107 Tivoli 



